The University of San Francisco

USF Scholarship: a digital repository @ Gleeson Library |
Geschke Center
Master's Theses

Theses, Dissertations, Capstones and Projects

Spring 5-9-2014

Impact of Natural Disaster Exposure on Prosocial
Preferences and Public Goods Provision: Evidence
from the Solomon Islands
Heather Belfor
hbbelfor@gmail.com

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.usfca.edu/thes
Part of the Behavioral Economics Commons, Growth and Development Commons, and the
Other Economics Commons
Recommended Citation
Belfor, Heather, "Impact of Natural Disaster Exposure on Prosocial Preferences and Public Goods Provision: Evidence from the
Solomon Islands" (2014). Master's Theses. 83.
https://repository.usfca.edu/thes/83

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses, Dissertations, Capstones and Projects at USF Scholarship: a digital repository @
Gleeson Library | Geschke Center. It has been accepted for inclusion in Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of USF Scholarship: a digital
repository @ Gleeson Library | Geschke Center. For more information, please contact repository@usfca.edu.

Impact of Natural Disaster Exposure on Prosocial
Preferences and Public Goods Provision: Evidence from
the Solomon Islands
!
!

Key Words: Natural Disaster Exposure, Provision of Public Goods, Prosocial Preferences
JEL Classifications: D7, H41, O12, Q54

Heather Belfor
Department of Economics
University of San Francisco
2130 Fulton St.
San Francisco, CA 94117
e-mail: hbbelfor@dons.usfca.edu
May 2014
Abstract: Natural disaster exposure can impact prosocial preferences, which indicate the level of social
capital, as well as create a shift in investments from public to private goods. Both are important
mechanisms to study in order to create optimal climate change adaptation policies. This study
evaluates the impact of natural disaster exposure on prosocial preferences and public goods provision
in the evaluated communities. The data used in this research comes from a process evaluation that
was carried out in the Solomon Islands on the Rural Development Program (RDP) and a Structured
Community Activity (SCA) experiment, which took place in 80 villages where 20 people in each
village were given money and had to decide how much to keep or contribute towards a community
good. There is no significant relationship between disaster exposure and prosocial preferences, yet
exposure to a natural disaster in the past year is found to significantly decrease contribution amounts
towards public goods in the SCA. A theoretical model of public goods provision is used to explain
how experiencing a shock increases the private return from keeping the money, and thereby,
decreases the amount contributed towards public goods.
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1. Introduction
Natural disasters have cost the global economy $2.5 trillion since 2000 (United Nations Office
for Disaster Risk Reduction, 2013). The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in their
fourth assessment report state that “warming of the climate is unequivocal” and illustrates the
increased likelihood of more severe and frequent natural disasters in the future (2007). Developing
countries are arguably the most affected by natural disasters. In addition to suffering from higher
national death counts, there are also systematic trade and development implications (Kahn, 2005). This
has been associated with the importance of strong economic and political institutions in mitigating
destruction and providing assistance for recovery (Noy, 2009). The Solomon Islands is a country
lacking such strong institutions but which experiences frequent climatic and geologic disasters. 81
percent of the people in the Solomon Islands live in rural areas with weak infrastructure and rely on
traditional knowledge about the environment (World Bank Report, 2010). As a result, it is important
to understand the implications of disaster exposure on their society, as climate change is a
contemporary threat. Understanding the impact of exposure on micro-level factors, such as individual
preferences and behaviors, is necessary in order to create optimal climate adaptation policies for
developing communities.
Current studies demonstrate that natural disaster exposure alters trust and cooperation
(Cassar et al., 2011) and changes the provision of public goods dynamics (Gangadharan and Nemes,
2009). The motivation for my research comes from a case study I conducted in the Solomon Islands
that corroborates these findings, as I found preferences and behaviors shift due to perceived
changes in the environment. My research questions examine this by investigating to what extent
natural disaster exposure impacts prosocial preferences and private provision of public goods. In
this analysis prosocial preferences refer to trust, altruism, and reciprocity and are used to interpret
the level of social capital in the communities. Social capital refers to the nature of connections and
networks available to individuals in a society (Bourdeiu, 1986). Contribution amounts towards public
goods from an experiment are used to evaluate collective-action and public goods provision
dynamics in the studied communities. To my knowledge, this is the first examination of the direct
impact of self-reported disaster exposure indicators on actual contribution amounts given to real
community projects.
I use evidence from a field experiment conducted in 80 villages across four provinces in the
Solomon Islands to measure the effect of a community-driven development (CDD) program called
!
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the Rural Development Program (RDP). This CDD program emphasizes community control over
planning decisions and resource investments. A Structured Community Activity (SCA) experiment
was done to see how a CDD approach (control group) versus a voucher-enhanced system
(treatment group) influences community interaction and contributions towards community projects.
The prosocial preference indicators, as well as the natural disaster exposure information, comes
from surveys done at the individual and community level at each of these 80 villages.
This research indicates there is no economic or statistically significant relationship between
natural disaster exposure and prosocial preferences except with two of the natural disaster exposure
indicators and altruism. These findings challenge the behavioral economics and sociological
literature supporting evidence of natural disaster exposure shifting prosocial preferences after
exposure. In addition, natural disaster exposure results in an economically and statistically significant
8 to 12 percentage point decrease in contribution amounts for four of the eight natural disaster
indicators. These findings support the public goods literature finding a decreased rate of cooperation
and public goods provision after natural disasters. I interpret these results in the context of a public
goods provision model. I show that the provision of public goods decreases in response to natural
disaster exposure because the private return from donating to the public good is less than the return
from keeping the money, thereby increasing individual utility when money is kept for private use.
The following section presents a review of the relevant literature. In Section 3, I briefly
discuss natural disasters in the Solomon Islands and some findings from my case study. Section 4
describes the methodology behind the design of the SCA, explains the data collection instruments,
interprets the summary statistics, and discusses the model used to analyze the data. Next, Section 5
interprets the results and robustness checks. Lastly, the discussion in Section 6 ties my results to the
literature, explains the public goods provision model created to explain the results and reveals
limitations in my research.

2. Literature Review
2.1 Social Capital and Trust in the Context of Natural Disasters
The concept of social capital is an integral part of theories regarding adaptive management in
the context of environmental risks. Generally, social capital refers to the nature of social obligations,
connections, and networks available to an individual in a given society (Bourdeiu, 1986). While there
are several different measures of social capital, a valuable measure used many times in the literature
!
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that is highly correlated with other measures of social capital is the degree of societal trust. Social
capital is a necessary element of economic transactions and has been linked to economic growth
because increased levels of trust leads to the establishment of better public institutions (Gambetta,
1990). The ability to adapt to changes in the environment also relies on networks and social capital
of groups, making trust important to future development after natural disasters strike (Geigler et al.,
1996 and Adger, 2003). A spillover effect from disasters may be an increase in trust if the society
has a decent amount of social capital to begin with. Toya and Skidmore (2012) found storm
frequency is correlated with larger amounts of trust in a high social capital society. Social capital and
trust seem to play an important role in how well a society manages natural disasters.
Research regarding natural disasters and their impact on social capital is growing, yet there is
still a lack of economic research relating natural disaster exposure to trust and other prosocial
preferences, such as altruism and reciprocity. Current research supports the idea of natural disasters
influencing individual perceptions and trust (Cameron and Shah, 2010). Cassar et al. (2011) found in
their experimental study higher levels of trust in Thai villages affected by the 2004 tsunami, relative
to villages not affected by the tsunami. There is also evidence suggesting disasters can increase
cooperation (Solnit, 2009). My research contributes to this literature as it investigates the impact of
disaster exposure on trust, reciprocity, and altruism.
2.2 Provision of Public Goods after Exposure to Natural Disasters
Public goods have been shown to be an indicator of strong institutions, and therefore, it is
important to study the provision of public goods in order to learn how to establish such institutions
that will lead to a good quality of life and environmental stability (United Nations Industrial
Development Organization, 2008). Natural disasters impact the social structure of a community,
changing the dynamics behind individual contributions to public goods. Hirschleifer (1983)
illustrates in his model that after natural disasters alliance-supportive activities become important
and all members of the community need to come together and cooperate to provide public goods.
This increased need for corporation in the provisioning of public goods is due to the fact that the
socially available amount is the minimum of the quantities individually provided towards public
goods. After a natural disaster, any single individual can reason that his or her own behavior might
be essential to the survival of the social alliance, causing individuals to self-sacrifice and give to
public goods in order to get through tough times. This explains historical observation that disaster
conditions tend to elicit an extraordinary amount of unselfish behavior. However, once
!
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contributions at the individual level are perceived by community members to no longer help in
sustaining a strong social alliance, a collapse of public goods provision may occur. If natural disaster
exposure threatens the social alliance in the Solomon Island communities and community members
are hesitant to contribute towards the provision of public goods, they may prefer to save their
money for private investments.
Being exposed to a natural disaster may create fear, change perceptions of future disaster
events, and even damage wealth, which all can potentially alter individual perceptions regarding risk
and uncertainty. If this were to happen, then people may be more or less inclined to contribute
towards a public good. Gustafsson et al. (2000) investigated this by comparing the voluntary
contributions to public goods with the same expected provision threshold but with different
variances in environmental uncertainty levels. Provision threshold in this literature refers to the
proportion of endowments from a community that need to be made towards a public good in order
for it to be established/ maintained. Overall, he found that the average contribution was smaller in
the high variance group (more environmental uncertainty). Wit and Wilke (1998) investigated the
impacts of environmental uncertainty and strategic uncertainty on contributions to public goods.
Strategic uncertainty refers to unknown information about the decisions of others in a public goods
setting causing coordination problems. These authors found lower contributions under high
environmental uncertainty, with the most dramatic drop in contribution levels when high
environmental uncertainty was coupled with high strategic uncertainty.
A study by Gangadharan and Nemes (2009) makes several contributions to this literature by
examining risk, uncertainty and variability in public versus private goods in a public goods setting.
They use an experimental setting to isolate strategic uncertainty from several forms of
environmental risk and uncertainty. These researchers find that even in payoff equivalent situations,
environmental risk and uncertainty associated with both private and public goods are significant
factors when making decisions. Since subjects are always facing some type of strategic uncertainty
with public goods, when environmental uncertainty is also related to the public good this leads to a
collapse in public goods contributions and an increase in private investment. If information on risk
and uncertainty behaviors were available in this study it may reveal that perhaps in the Solomon
Islands, natural disaster exposure increases perceived uncertainty and risk, thereby decreasing the
private return they receive from contributing to a public good. In spite of this data not being
available, my research adds to the growing body of literature examining the relationship between
disaster exposure and provision of public goods dynamics.
!
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2.3 Internal Motivations Behind Contributions
It is important to understand the internal motivations behind donating towards public goods
in order to get a complete picture regarding public goods provision. The seminal work by Adreoni
(1990) explains the psychological motivations behind contributing to charities and public goods.
Adreoni (1988) demonstrates that the existence of organizations like the Red Cross and the
Salvation Army are inconsistent with standard consumer theory, where the motivation to give is to
receive something in return. His solution to this is the idea of ‘warm glow of giving,’ which is where
people gain utility just from the act of giving and nothing else. He calls this model the impure altruism
model and warns the conventional view of charitable giving is inaccurate and it is important to
develop models accounting for this impure altruism. If the motivation to contribute towards the
community goods in the SCA came from an internal motivation, then the level of altruism in the
communities could be used as an explanation for the contribution results.
The model by Brekke et al. (2003) called the model of moral motivation, assumes people want to
think of themselves as socially responsible. Individuals first determine their morally ideal effort by
asking themselves what the consequences of social welfare would be if everyone in society acted as
they did. Next, individuals want to maximize their utility by trading the benefits of maintaining a
self-image as a socially responsible person against costs. Basically, a better self-image can only be
obtained if one truly does what they believe is morally right. From this model, it predicts monetary
incentives decrease morally motivated contributions, which is shared in Frey’s (1997) crowding theory.
Frey’s theory argues that although external incentives such as fees increase economic incentives to
contribute, they can reduce an individual’s intrinsic motivation. This can be used to explain why
individuals may not have donated more towards the community projects in the SCA. The
participants may have high levels of prosocial preferences that would normally increase their
motivation to contribute. However, monetary incentives may have decreased their morally
motivated contributions because keeping more money for themselves gave them a higher individual
utility than giving the money to the public good. My study contributes to this literature because it
examines if internal motivations are potentially influencing the contributions amounts towards the
community projects in the studied communities.
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3. Setting: Natural Disasters in the Solomon Islands
There are a total of nine provinces in the Solomon Islands containing about 500,000 people.
Choiseul, Malaita, Temotu and Western provinces were involved in the process evaluation and
experiment used in this research. These provinces have about 26,000, 120,000, 21,000, and 62,000
people respectively. 81% of the population in the Solomon Islands lives in rural areas, especially in
those provinces (World Bank Report, 2010). Most of these people provide for their families through
subsistence farming and fishing, with a small amount of trade. However, in Western Province there
is a small, thriving tourist economy. Most of the technology, such as Internet, electricity, and phone,
is in the provincial capital of each province, however, even that is minimal. Their main source of
transportation are small motor powered fishing boats, except in Malaita and Western where there are
some roads and vehicles potentially because these two provinces are larger and have more
inhabitants. As a result of the infrastructure and lifestyle, daily life is heavily influenced by weather.
In the Solomon Islands the typical weather pattern consists of heavy and frequent rains from
mid-December through mid-May because of monsoon winds from the west and northwest causing
the wet season, consisting of higher temperatures, humidity, and rainfall. The rest of the year they
experience southeasterly winds producing mild weather with lighter and less frequent rainfall.
A case study I conducted in Choiseul province in the summer of 2013 found strong evidence
of people relying on traditional knowledge about weather, agriculture, and fishing (see Appendix C).
A change in their environment that cannot be explained by this knowledge hurts their ability to
survive and may impact long-term development. As part of my fieldwork I conducted interviews
with members of each community I visited to discuss their perceptions of climate change. Most of
these interviews revealed that they have been noticing changes in their environment over the past
few decades, especially within the last 10 years. The most reported change was more frequent rain
showers that are heavier in nature. These weather changes, as well as increased deforestation, have
resulted in topsoil depletion and smaller-sized crops. Increased humidity from heavier rains
throughout the year has caused an escalation in crop diseases and mold. In Choiseul and Malaita
they also self-reported experiencing floods and landslides in the past year, possibly due to these
heavier rains.
The people of Choiseul also expressed experiencing periods of drought with high
temperatures quite regularly over the last ten years. Choiseul province observed this the most over
the past year, where the other provinces have just a few self-reported cases. The people in the
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regions of Western, Choiseul, and Temotu are also very weary of earthquakes and tsunamis.
Choiseul and Western experienced a massive tsunami in 2007 and Temotu in 2013. They also
experienced earthquakes in 2010. There was evident concern over what to do if another incident
were to occur.
From my interviews with the community members in the villages of Choiseul it seems as
though they are cautious of environmental change, but have little understanding of what it means
and how to adapt to the changes. Many community members are worried about the decisions made
by the community. They have become wary of investment, in particular RDP funded infrastructure
projects, because of the risk associated with it being destroyed by a climatic or geologic related
event. Yet they feel as though they do not have the right tools to make the least risky decisions.
Understanding how these disasters impact their behaviors and preferences is key in order to
create effective climate adaptation policies that will better equip them to withstand the future
impacts of climate change.

4. Methodology
During the summer of 2013, a group of researchers from multiple universities traveled to the
Solomon Islands to conduct a process evaluation of the Rural Development Program (RDP).
Communities were selected at random for the evaluation from a set of communities that participated
in the RDP pilot program. These communities were involved in the first three cycles of the
program, which took place in four of the nine provinces in the Solomon Islands. As part of this
evaluation, a Structured Community Activity (SCA) and three different types of surveys were
conducted in 80 communities.
4.1 Empirical Design
The community driven development (CDD) process is a fundamental part of the RDP,
which involves giving an allotted amount of money for a community project, where as a community
they decide the project, implement it, and maintain it. One of the main goals of the RDP was to
increase involvement by marginalized groups and women in the decision-making and
implementation process as a way of encouraging empowerment. Another goal was to bring public
goods to the communities that were truly needed. The SCA conducted in each of the 80
communities is used to assess how a voucher-enhanced form of CDD would impact collective!

! 7!

action and participation by marginalized groups. The SCA is designed to measure how communities
respond to real-world situations in areas where the CDD project had sought to change behavior.
Before entering the field, communities were chosen at random to be in either the control or
treatment group, with 40 communities in each group and a total of 1,555 individuals taking part in
the SCA experiments. Upon arrival into each community, a meeting was called where we read a
script aloud describing who we were and why we were there. During this time, we asked those
attending to write their names on a piece of paper. Female and male names were put into two
separate bags and a younger volunteer from the community picked out 9 from each to take part in
the SCA. 18 individuals were chosen at random to take part in the experiment, along with one male
and one female leader, resulting in 20 subjects per experiment.
The control subjects, groups of 20 experimental participants, were given a block grant of SI
(Solomon Island dollars) $2,000, which is about USD $275. Just like in the RDP projects, the
control group had an allotted block grant and the subjects had power over planning decisions and
resource investments. In the treatment group, every subject was instead given 10 vouchers worth SI
$5 each for a total of SI $50 (about USD $7). The treatment groups were informed that they could
use this to help fund a community project of their choice or to be redeemed individually for cash.
They were also told that any individual contribution towards the community project would be
doubled. From a game theoretic approach, it is in the best interest for everyone in the treatment
group to donate towards the community project, as this will result in a community contribution of
SI $2000. However, if everyone keeps at least some of his or her vouchers, the overall total amount
will always be lower. The purpose of this activity is twofold. One is to see how they make decisions,
and two, to assess the dynamics within the communities through this voucher-enhanced approach.
Once all the subjects that were chosen for the SCA were in the designated meeting space, it
was explained that a SCA was going to be conducted to assess how they made decisions. They were
then told as to whether they were given a block grant, or if they were given vouchers. If they were in
the treatment group, they would not be allowed to make their choices regarding how much to keep
or donate until after the project decision was made. It was made clear to both groups that this
money could only be spent on maintenance or improvement of a local public building or other
space (must be nonreligious), drinking water or sanitation facility, or local irrigation system. Any
other resources that may be needed to build these projects, including labor and food, would have to
be donated by the community. After they were made aware of the details of the SCA, they then had
unlimited time as a group to discuss how to spend the money. We observed and filmed how the
!
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project decisions were made. This information helps in deciphering the dynamics of the community.
At the end of their discussion a verdict on the project needed to be made, including who would pick
up the materials at the hardware store, which hardware store they wanted to use, and other details
about their decision. They were made aware that in around three months time, researchers were
going to come back to check on the progress of their projects.
This exercise captures the degree to which experience of project management under RDP
and being involved in the process has enhanced the capacity of villagers to act collectively and take
up a development project outside of the sphere of the RDP project.
4.2 Data Sources
There are three key data sources:
(i) Individual survey: The individual surveys were given to the 20 participants in each
community that took part in the SCA. The resulting sample, after accounting for people leaving the
experiment or not showing up, consists of 1,520 individuals (772 males, 748 women). This survey
was conducted as an exit questionnaire after the experiment was completed and contained 40
questions. Most of the control variables used in this research come from this survey, along with the
prosocial preference indicators on trust, reciprocity, and altruism. These prosocial preferences were
elicited from situational questions asking the participants to rank from 0 to 10 what they would do
in each given situation.
(ii) Community survey: There was a community leader survey that was implemented through a
focus group after the SCA was conducted in each of the 80 communities to answer questions about
issues affecting the community as a whole. Typically, the one male and female community leader
from the experiment, as well as the community chief, members of the RDP’s sub-project
implementation committee (SIC), and a couple other leaders were present. The aim of this survey
was to analyze the RDP process. This questionnaire included 134 questions in which the subjects
had to respond yes/no or give a specific answer as a group. This is the source of the disaster
indicator variables. These questions asked the leaders to indicate if their village had experienced any
one of the following natural disasters in the past year: drought, earthquake, flood, typhoon,
landslide, tsunami, high rains, or a volcanic eruption.
(iii) Household survey: Lastly, there was a household survey carried out in about 10 randomly
selected households from each community. The total number of households that took part in this
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survey is 765. This survey may provide some interesting results, however, data from this survey will
not be used in this analysis.
4.3 Data Description
Table 1 presents the summary statistics on key variables used in this research. The overall
sample mean for the control variables show on average the most frequent marital status is married,
average age is about 40 years old, and average number of children is between 3 and 4. The average
overall wealth is close to 1, meaning most people own at least one of the three indicators in the
wealth index (motor, mobile, and radio). The RDP indicators are included in the regression analysis
of contribution amounts, as involvement in the RDP may influence contributions towards other
community projects. On average, most people participated in the building of the RDP project,
around half participated in the RDP meetings, and a small amount of the subjects were actually
members in the RDP. Satisfaction of project variable is included as a control because satisfaction with
the SCA project chosen may influence the contribution amounts in the activity. The mean shows
SCA project satisfaction was generally high.
Table 1 also describes the difference in means between the treatment and control groups for
all of the subjects. There are only two control variables, participating in RDP meetings and participating in
the building of RDP projects, which are significantly different between the groups. The variables with
significant differences in means between these groups reflect the random heterogeneity in this
sample that could not be controlled for through the study design. There would be no way to control
for these differences without intervening in the selection of the participants, which ideally are as
random as possible. To control for the potential bias between the groups, I made sure to include
the variables exhibiting significant difference in means in my analysis.
In addition, the difference in means between all subjects who were exposed to at least one
natural disaster in the past year compared to those who were not are reported in Table 1. There are
seven control variables with significantly different means. To explore this further, Table 2 also
shows the difference in means between subjects only in the treatment group by exposure to natural
disasters (see Appendix A). This is important to dissect, as analysis regarding the SCA contribution
amounts only deals with the treatment group, as those were the only subjects who could make
contributions. Table 2 shows four control variables with significantly different means. If natural
disaster exposure is truly random, these differences should not exist. However, some of these
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differences may be a consequence of exposure to natural disasters, which will be dissected further in
the results section.

Control Variables
Married
Engaged
Single
Widower
Female
Age
Number of Children
Wealth
Spouse Present during
SCA
Participated in RDP
Meetings
Member of RDP
Participated in Building
of RDP Project
Satisfaction with
Project

Table 1: Summary Statistics for All Subjects
All Subjects
Overall
Treatment Control
t-statistic
No
Exposure
(N, Std. Dev.)
Group
Group
(N for 0,1)
Exposure

t-statistic
(N for 0,1)

0.72
(1600, 0.45)
0.02
(1600, 0.14)
0.17
(1600, 0.37)
0.05
(1600, 0.22)
0.50
(1600, 0.50)
39.70
(1520, 14.13)
3.52
(1501, 2.54)
1.13
(1600, 0.86)

0.73
(0.44)
0.02
(0.15)
0.17
(0.37)
0.05
(0.22)
0.50
(0.50)
39.76
(13.74)
3.48
(2.57)
1.17
(0.85)

0.70
(0.46)
0.01
(0.12)
0.16
(0.37)
0.05
(0.22)
0.50
(0.50)
39.63
(14.53)
3.56
(2.51)
1.10
(0.86)

1.11
(800, 800)
1.47
(800, 800)
0.13
(800, 800)
0.00
(800, 800)
0.00
(800, 800)
0.18
(741, 779)
0.59
(736, 765)
1.60
(800, 800)

0.72
(0.45)
0.02
(0.13)
0.14
(0.35)
0.05
(0.22)
0.50
(0.50)
40.27
(13.91)
3.64
(2.49)
1.16
(0.89)

0.70
(0.46)
0.02
(0.14)
0.21
(0.41)
0.04
(0.21)
0.50
(0.50)
38.54
(14.50)
3.28
(2.61)
1.07
(0.78)

1.00
(520, 1080)
0.10
(520, 1080)
3.64***
(520, 1080)
0.73
(520, 1080)
0.00
(520, 1080)
2.25**
(507, 1013)
2.63***
(504, 997)
2.16**
(520, 1080)

0.55
(1500, 0.73)

0.55
(0.73)

0.56
(0.73)

0.31
(733, 767)

0.50
(0.70)

0.65
(0.78)

3.71***
(507, 993)

0.60
(1480, 0.49)
0.18
(1175, 0.39)

0.57
(0.50)
0.17
(0.37)

0.64
(0.48)
0.20
(0.40)

2.82***
(716, 764)
1.37
(579, 596)

0.58
(0.49)
0.17
(0.37)

0.64
(0.48)
0.22
(0.41)

1.98**
(505, 975)
2.12**
(354, 821)

0.78
(1457, 0.42)

0.76
(0.43)

0.80
(0.40)

1.80*
(707, 750)

0.77
(0.42)

0.80
(0.40)

1.09
(494, 963)

0.95
(1506, 0.21)

0.96
(0.20)

0.95
(0.22)

0.97
(733, 773)

0.95
(0.22)

0.96
(0.19)

1.21
(500, 1006)

Notes: This table reports the means, standard deviations, and t-tests of difference in means. The variable used to assess exposure is
the "exposed1" variable, which takes on the value of 1 if a community experienced at least one natural disaster in the past year. ***
indicates difference is statistically significant at the 1% level, ** at 5% level, and * at 10% level.

Outcomes of interest are displayed in Table 3 (see Appendix A). When looking at the means
in the table for the prosocial preferences separated by exposure for all subjects, it would seem as
though subjects who were not exposed to a natural disaster exhibit higher levels of trust, reciprocity,
and altruism. However, within the treatment group this is not the case, as this relationship is
reversed for trust and reciprocity. It is interesting to note that on average the subjects displayed mid
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to upper-levels of trust, reciprocity and altruism, despite being concerned about safety in their village
and worried others will cheat or steal.
4.4 Identification Strategy and Model
The Solomon Islands are located in the Pacific Ocean in an area frequently hit by typhoons
and heavy rains from mid-December through mid-May, occasionally causing floods and landslides.
They also experience droughts, especially more frequently due to the change in weather patterns
they have been experiencing. Since the Solomon Islands are composed of islands, earthquakes and
tsunamis are also fairly frequent, along with occasional volcanic eruptions. No typhoons or
volcanoes were reported, and therefore, will not be included in the following analysis. These natural
disasters hit the Solomon Islands every year, each different in size and intensity and impacting
different regions of the islands. Table 4 and Graph 1 illustrate the types and frequencies of natural
disasters, and reflect the strong variance across provinces. This variation is necessary in order to
compare outcomes across groups.
Table 4: Frequency of Disasters by Province
Typhoon
Landslide
Tsunami
High Rains

Province

Drought

Earthquake

Flood

Choiseul
Malaita
Temotu
Western

8
1
0
3

6
0
1
3

8
1
0
0

0
0
0
0

2
3
0
0

4
2
1
0

Total

12

10

9

0

5

7

Volcano

Exposed1

Exposed2

3
7
11
14

0
0
0
0

15
12
11
16

9
1
1
6

35

0

54

17

Note: This table reports the frequency of natural disasters by Province. This data is at the village level. The exposed1 variable indicates if a village
experienced at least one natural disaster in the past year, and the exposed2 variable indicates if a village experienced at least two natural disasters in the
past year.

Graph 1: Natural Disaster Types and Frequency
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To estimate the impact of exposure to these events on prosocial preferences and
contribution amounts in the SCA, I use a standard Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model and
estimate the following model:
!! = !! + !! !! + !! !! + !! + !!
Where !! are the dependent variables, either prosocial preference (trust, reciprocity, or
altruism) or contribution amount in the SCA for individual i; !! is the disaster indicator (drought,
earthquake, flood, landslide, tsunami, highrain, exposed1, or exposed2) used individually in separate
regressions to analyze the distinct impacts of each indicator. The exposure variables indicate if these
individuals were exposed to at least one or two of the six natural disasters in the past year. !! is the
vector of control variables, !! !is province-level fixed effects used to account for time-invariant
province level characteristics and !! is an individual-specific error term. Standard errors are clustered
at the community level to account for similarities within communities, creating 80 clusters. The
natural disaster indicators only refer to the past year of exposure, so conclusions regarding impacts
of shocks on social capital and donations to public goods are measuring short-term responses.
Though some would consider natural disasters to be exogenous, there is reason to believe
that observed and unobserved characteristics of households may affect exposure to such disasters,
thereby raising the concern for endogeneity. Characteristics that cannot be controlled for may
influence the level of exposure to natural disasters. For example, observable factors, such as wealth,
occupation or family, may push some people to live in certain areas and types of dwellings versus
others, possibly making the populations exposed more to natural disasters systematically different
from those who are exposed less. However, in this case it is of less concern because these people all
live in fairly homogeneous dwellings, tend to live close to kin making migration uncommon, and
92% of the sample lives in coastal villages. In addition, I am including province level fixed effects to
soak up all such unobservable differences across provinces.
In order for this model to be identified the conditional independence assumption must hold.
This would be violated, for example, if actual exposure and response to the disaster variable
question differ systematically from one another. However, this cannot be tested directly. Therefore,
conditional on the variables I control for, exposure to disasters is believed to be exogenous.
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5. Results
5.1 Natural Disaster Exposure and Prosocial Preferences
First I test whether exposure influences prosocial preferences. Also, Table 7 in this analysis
shows OLS regressions with controls, province level fixed effects, clustered standard errors at the
village level, and reports significance using the Holm-Bonferroni correction. Since I am regressing
each natural disaster indicator separately to see the individual impacts of each, this correction
controls for a possible familywise error rate, which is the probability of making one or more type 1
errors among all the hypotheses. All three prosocial preferences, trust, reciprocity and altruism,
cannot be included in the same regression because of endogeneity concerns, and hence, the
hypotheses and analytical tests must be separated. The outcomes used in this analysis are an
aggregate of the two indicators gathered for each prosocial preference, and therefore, are on a scale
of 0 to 20.
(i) Trust: Table 7 shows no economic or statistical significance of disaster exposure on trust
for all of the indicators. When looking at Table 3 it seems as though trust is slightly higher when not
exposed to natural disasters, yet this difference is not significant (see Appendix A). Given this
evidence, I cannot reject the null hypothesis and must conclude natural disaster exposure has no
significant effect on trust amongst the community members in the SCA.
(ii) Reciprocity: Table 7 illustrates no significance of exposure on reciprocity. Table 3 shows
reciprocity is slightly higher on average for individuals not exposed, but again, this difference is not
significant. Therefore, I cannot reject the null hypothesis and infer disaster exposure has no
significant effect on reciprocity.
(iii) Altruism: Table 7 portrays a different story about altruism compared to the other
prosocial indicators. There are two disaster indicators, high rains and exposed1, which show significant
effects at the 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. These two indicators positively impact
altruism by about 1 percentage point. When looking at Table 3 the average level of altruism is
significantly higher in the group not exposed to a disaster compared to those who were. To see what
may be driving these results, I run a regression after removing high rains as a disaster for the exposed1
indicator. After doing this, exposed1 still shows significance at the 10% level, thereby illustrating that
there is another explanation for these results. As a result of these outcomes, I cannot reject the null
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hypothesis of no effect of exposure on altruism at the 5% significance level except with the high rains
indicator.

Table 7: Weather Indicator Regression Results for Prosocial Preference Outcome Variables (OLS Estimations)
Trust
Reciprocity
Altruism
(1)
(2)
(3)
DISASTER
VARIABLES

OLS with
Controls

# of Observ.
R-squared

OLS with
Controls

# of Observ.
R-squared

OLS with
Controls

# of Observ.
R-squared

Drought

0.021
1390
-0.74
1407
0.11
1388
(0.72)
0.05
(0.71)
0.05
(0.47)
0.09
Earthquake
-0.233
1390
-0.712
1407
0.77
1388
(0.72)
0.05
(0.60)
0.05
(0.42)
0.09
Flood
-0.54
1390
-0.54
1407
0.39
1388
(0.81)
0.05
(0.55)
0.05
(0.40)
0.09
Landslide
0.65
1390
0.59
1407
-0.06
1388
(0.49)
0.05
(0.56)
0.05
(0.41)
0.09
Tsunami
0.22
1390
-0.47
1407
-0.37
1388
(0.70)
0.05
(0.25)
0.05
(0.35)
0.09
High rains
0.05
1363
0.04
1379
1.04**
1359
(0.59)
0.05
(0.45)
0.05
(0.29)
0.11
Exposed to 1
-0.14
1406
-0.15
1423
0.76*
1404
(0.48)
0.05
(0.34)
0.05
(0.32)
0.10
Exposed to 2
0.44
1406
-0.29
1423
0.44
1404
(0.52)
0.05
(0.45)
0.05
(0.39)
0.09
Note: Each of these indicators were run separately in a regression with the prosocial preferences as the outcome.
Individual controls are not included in this table. These controls are: Marital Status dummies, Female dummy,
Age, Number of Children, and Wealth. Age shows significance in all of the regressions listed in column 1.
Number of children shows significance in all of the regressions in column 2. None of the control variables show
significance in any of the regressions in column 3. Fixed effects are used along with clustered standard errors at
the village level. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** indicates statistical significance at 1% level, ** at
5% level, and * at 10% level and are adjusted with the Holm-Bonferroni correction.

However, it is hard to establish inference from the altruism indicator because it lacks
credibility regarding how this related question was asked in the survey. Each prosocial indicator
involved two questions that were asked sequentially. The altruism2 indicator was elicited on the
opposite scale as all of the other prosocial questions and when it is re-scaled it reveals a different
distribution compared to altruism1 and the other prosocial indicators as seen in Graphs 6 through 11
(see Appendix B). Therefore, this indicates a poorly worded question or confusion among the
respondents.
There are an additional two indicators from the individual survey reporting if the participants
from the SCA feel safe in their community and if they are worried others may cheat or steal from
them. The perception of safety in a society can be used as a proxy for the level of social capital.
!
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Social capital is thought to be deeply rooted in a society and is formed as a response to the
environment (Toya and Skidmore, 2012). Since disaster exposure does not influence the prosocial
preferences tested above, possibly because they have formed in response to frequent exposure, then
disasters should not have an effect on other indicators of social capital. As shown in Table 8, I run
OLS estimations as a robustness check and find no significant effect of any of the disaster indicators
on feeling safe or worried others will cheat or steal (see Appendix A). Disaster exposure appears to not be
influencing indicators relating to social capital. Therefore, respondents’ decision to donate less
towards a public good when exposed to a natural disaster is more likely motivated by dynamics
involving public goods provision and not because the level of social capital has shifted.
5.2 Natural Disaster Exposure and Contribution Amounts
In this section, I test whether being exposed to a natural disaster significantly affects
contribution amounts. The OLS regressions presented in Table 5 include results with controls,
province level fixed effects, and clustered standard errors at the village level, as well as displays
results with and without the Holm-Bonferroni correction. The OLS regressions in column 2 show
four disaster indicators that have economic and statistically significantly negative impacts on
contribution amounts; therefore, we can reject the null for these indicators at the 5% and 10%
significance levels. The exposed variables, which denotes if a community has experienced at least
one or two natural disasters in the past year, indicates that being exposed to any of the natural
disasters significantly decreases contribution amounts by about eight percentage points.
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Table 5: Disaster Indicator Regression Results for Contribution Amount
Outcome Variable (OLS Estimation)
(1)
(2)
Without
# of Obsv.
With
# of Obsv.
Correction R-squared Correction R-squared
VARIABLES
Drought
Earthquake
Flood
Landslide
Tsunami
High rains
Exposed to 1
Exposed to 2

-8.93**
(3.60)
-2.68
(3.54)
-9.87
(5.93)
-12.87***
(1.97)
-6.64*
(3.83)
-6.12*
(3.58)
-8.49**
(3.51)
-8.98**
(3.48)

535
0.09
535
0.05
535
0.07
535
0.03
535
0.04
535
0.07
535
0.11
535
0.09

-8.93**
(3.60)
-2.68
(3.54)
-9.87
(5.93)
-12.87**
(1.97)
-6.64
(3.83)
-6.12
(3.58)
-8.49*
(3.51)
-8.98**
(3.48)

535
0.09
535
0.05
535
0.07
535
0.03
535
0.04
535
0.07
535
0.11
535
0.09

Note: Each of these indicators were run separately in a regression with
Contribution Amount as the outcome. Individual controls are not included in
this table. These controls are: Marital Status dummies, Female dummy, Age,
Number of Children, Wealth, Satisfaction with SCA project, Spouse Present
during SCA, Member of RDP, Participated in RDP meetings and Participated in
RDP building process. None of these controls show significance in any of the
regressions. Standard errors are clustered at the village level and are in
parentheses. *** indicates statistical significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level, and
* at 10% level and in column 2 reported according to the Holm-Bonferroni
correction.

These findings indicate disaster exposure significantly influences public goods provision in
the SCA in these communities. Table 6 indicates about 75% of all individuals gave half or more of
their voucher money towards the community good (see Appendix A). This table also shows the
contribution amounts of individuals exposed to natural disasters compared to those who were not.
About 82% of the individuals who were not exposed to a natural disaster donated half or more of
their vouchers towards the community good, where about 70% donated half or more when exposed.
!
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40% of those not exposed donated 40 or more, compared to 19% of those exposed. These results
demonstrate that exposure to natural disasters reduces the amount individuals contribute to public
goods.
5.3 Relationship between Prosocial Preferences and Contribution Amounts
To assess what is driving the results behind natural disaster exposure impacting contribution
amounts, I cannot run a regression including both contribution amounts and prosocial preferences
because of endogeneity concerns. Both prosocial preferences and contribution amounts in the SCA
could be correlated with omitted variables. For example, education could influence both and is not
an observed variable that can be controlled for in the regressions. Instead I run a basic correlation
between the two outcomes, although there still may be endogeneity coming from uncontrolled
confounding variables. Table 9 has the results, and from this it is clear the correlation between
contribution amounts and prosocial preferences are not strong. As a result, this further illustrates
why a social capital framework should not be used to explain the results of a significant and negative
impact of natural disaster exposure on contribution amounts.

Table 9: Correlation Between Prosocial and Contribution
Altruism
Reciprocity
Trust
SCA Contribution
Altruism
1.00
Reciprocity
0.37
1.00
Trust
0.36
0.38
1.00
SCA Contribution
0.1163
0.0379
0.0595
1.00
Notes: This table reports the correlation coefficients between the prosocial preferences and
SCA contribution amount.
5.4 Robustness Checks with Alternative Models
While OLS is my preferred estimation procedure, I explore alternative approaches as a
robustness check. An ordered logit uses the same assumptions as the OLS model yet the dependent
variable is ranked ordinally. Both the prosocial preference indicators and the SCA contributions
variable are categorical and arranged in a meaningful way. In both cases an incremental increase in
value means each individual either donates more or has higher levels of trust, reciprocity, and
altruism. When I use an ordered logit I find similar results for all three prosocial preference
indicators as with the OLS where high rains is the only disaster indicator showing significance with
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altruism at the 5% significance level. Also, this model shows similar results where there is a
significant and negative effect of disaster exposure on SCA contribution amounts for four of the
disaster indicators at the 5% or 10% significance levels. Results for both are in Tables 10 and 11 (see
Appendix A). However, an ordered logit only applies to data that meet the proportional odds
assumption. This assumption means that the coefficients describing the relationship between any
two pairs of outcome groups are statistically the same. In my case, when the proportional odds
assumption is tested, it does not hold for any of the regressions; the practical implications of
violating this assumption are minimal (Williams, 2013 and Long and Freese, 2006). Other models
may be used to correct for this issue, such as a multinomial logit, dichotomizing the outcome for use
in a binary logit, or using a generalized ordered logit. However, these cannot be performed because
they either violate key assumptions related to the data or may alter conclusions in a substantive way.
A tobit model can be used as an alternative method when analyzing the prosocial
preferences. Looking at the histograms for all three prosocial preference indicators, as seen in
Graphs 2, 3, and 4, there are far more people exhibiting high levels of each indicator than one would
expect by looking at the distribution (see Appendix B). Thus, this indicates a possible censoring
issue. This is not the case with the SCA contribution amounts, which can be seen in Graph 5 (see
Appendix B), and therefore, this model will not be used for analyzing this dependent variable. This
model is represented in Table 12 and resulted in similar results as the OLS estimations for the
prosocial preferences (see Appendix A). The only significant difference between this model and the
OLS is the tsunami indicator, which now shows a significant and negative result on reciprocity at the
5% significance level. Also, the high rains indicator now shows significance at the 1% level.
However, despite these differences, the results from both the ordered logit and tobit models suggest
my findings are robust.

6. Discussion
6.1 Findings in Relationship to the Literature
The intention of collecting data on prosocial preferences was to gather evidence on the level
of social capital in these communities. This information contributes to the understanding of
collective action in the community and leadership dynamics, both of which are important to
understand when evaluating the success of the RDP. Despite altruism being impacted by high rains
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exposure, these results tell us the level of social capital overall is not being influenced by exogenous
shocks from the environment. This evidence refutes current research supporting the idea of natural
disasters influencing prosocial preferences (Cameron and Shah, 2010). Most of the research
investigating the relationship between prosocial preferences and natural disasters observe higher
levels of prosocial preferences in areas affected by natural disasters compared to those not exposed
(Cassar et al., 2011). It is important to keep in mind that I may find no significance in my data as a
result of having an indicator that only picks up on natural disaster exposure within the past year.
One of the main purposes of conducting the SCA experiment was to assess collective action
and contribution towards community projects. The results show a significant and negative effect of
natural disaster exposure on contribution amounts. From these results, it can be inferred that if there
was less exposure to natural disasters in the Solomon Islands there may be higher contribution
amounts towards community goods. These findings contradict some of the behavioral literature,
which suggests natural disaster exposure increases collective action, and therefore, should increase
contributions to public goods (Solnit, 2009). However, these results also strengthen the conclusions
in the public goods provision literature that have linked natural disasters with reduced rates of
intensity in cooperative behavior tested through donations towards public versus private goods (Au,
2004).
6.2 Explaining Contributions with a Public Goods Provision Model
To interpret these results I use a public goods provision model based on Gangadharan and
Nemes (2009) to explain the significant decrease in contributions as a response to disaster exposure.
As described in the literature review, they use an experimental setting to isolate several forms of
environmental risk and uncertainty using known (risk), unknown (uncertainty), and endogenous
(incentives treatments) probabilities. Subjects always face some type of strategic uncertainty (group
size, communication, incentives to contribute) with public goods, and when environmental
uncertainty is also related to the public good this leads to a decrease in public goods contributions
and an increase in private investment. The assumptions used in my model are not only based on
Gangadharan and Nemes (2009), but also from previously cited literature finding natural disaster
shocks and environmental uncertainty negatively impact the amount one contributes to a public
good (Wit and Wilke, 1998, Au, 2004, and Gustafsson et al., 2000). Disaster shocks decrease the
private return from contributing to the public good because individuals rather avoid higher levels of
uncertainty in favor of lower levels, which is why the return from keeping money increases.
!
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Uncertainty is something people try to avoid at all costs. Subjects in experiments have been willing
to pay to avoid uncertainty in favor of risk (Rapport and Suleiman, 1988 and 1992).
Distinct from this literature, I propose a different mechanism to explain smaller contribution
amounts to public goods post disaster. Similar to Gangadharan and Nemes (2009), I highlight
individual utility and return between keeping money and contributing towards public goods after
disaster exposure. However, instead of relating individual utility and return to uncertainty and risk it
is explained by the importance of recovering from private losses first before contributing to public
goods.
My model is specified in the following manner:
!! ! !!(!)!(1 − !! ) + !! !!(!)!!

= Individual!Utility!Function

! = Individual!Return!to!Keeping!Money!from!SCA
!! = Individual!Contribution!to!Public!Good!in!SCA!
! = Exogenous!Disaster!Shocks!
! = Individual!Return!from!Giving!to!Public!Good
!

!=2

(!") = Total!Contribution!to!Public!Good
!!!

! ∈ !!! , !! ! : Contributions!are!low!or!high!amounts
!! ∈ !!! , !! ! :!Disaster!shocks!are!low!or!high!

The utility function above is representing the total individual utility for every individual when
establishing contributions towards a public good. The !! is an additively separable function of f and
g, which represents the utility from giving to the private versus public good. S represents exogenous
shocks from natural disasters. G represents the total amount of contributions to the public good in
the SCA, which is equal to double of the total amount of contributions from all individuals. Each
individual also receives a private return or benefit from keeping the money, as described by ! , as
well as a return from giving to the public good, represented as ! .
By assumption !′! is larger than !′! . This is because people exposed to natural disasters
suffer private losses, so it is more important for them to recover from their private losses first
before contributing to public goods. Thus, the utility from keeping the money when exposed to high
environmental shocks is larger than when exposed to low environmental shocks, as described by:
!!

! !!(1 − !! , !!

> !! ! !!(1 − !! , !! . Therefore, experiencing a shock !! would lead to !! as

they would want to keep more money for themselves.
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As seen in my data, disaster exposure significantly decreases the amount individuals give to
the public good in the SCA by about eight percentage points. There are no other indicators that
show significance in relationship to contribution amounts. Therefore, given the available data, the
model I have created illustrates that individuals in communities exposed to a natural disaster in the
past year donate less in the SCA because the exogenous shocks from the environment decrease the
private return to donating towards a public good.
There could be many different reasons why this is the case. One possible explanation is
uncertainty levels and risks are increased when there is exposure to natural disasters, thereby
decreasing confidence in making contributions towards public goods investments. Another possible
explanation is that households have formed beliefs about future shocks in response to their past
exposure and are donating less when exposed because of these beliefs. However, both of these
explanations are beyond the scope of my study.
6.3 Limitations of Research
There is some concern regarding the accuracy of the findings related to natural disaster
exposure and prosocial indicators. The prosocial questions may have been hard to interpret for
some of the individuals taking the survey because these indicators were elicited using fairly
complicated situational questions. There is also some doubt regarding if the disaster indicators pick
up the true impact of exposure on prosocial preferences since these indicators are only based on the
past year of exposure. These indicators were based on questions asked to a group of individuals and
were not based on actual weather data, therefore, recalling disaster exposure for more than a year
ago would lead to biased results. In the literature prosocial preferences have been found to be stable
over time in a society as they are deeply routed in culture (Bjørnskov, 2006). Social capital is also a
reflection of the environment subjects are in (Toya and Skidmore, 2012). If these individuals have
experienced natural disasters fairly frequently over the years, their prosocial preferences may have
developed in response to this frequency. Therefore, this analysis may not show the true impact of
natural disaster exposure on prosocial preferences within a year time frame.
Other potential areas of weakness come from the natural disaster indicators and how they
were elicited in the study. Since the natural disaster questions were asked in the community survey
this could cause potential bias because these self-reported measures were gathered from about five
people in each community. It would have been better to collect the disaster indicators in the
individual survey to reduce bias and potentially make the analysis more accurate. Fixed effects at the
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village level would be desirable in order to absorb the unobserved differences across villages, but
this was infeasible due to disaster variables varying only at the village level.
While my results suggest that individual utility related to contributing in the SCA is
negatively impacted when exposed to natural disasters, more data would have allowed investigation
of different mechanisms to explain these results. Additional questions asking explicitly why they
decided to donate more or less to the community projects in the SCA would have provided further
explanation regarding their motivations behind contributing. Measurements on education would
have added information that potentially could have influenced both contribution amounts and
prosocial preferences. Including indicators in the study assessing uncertainty or risk from the
environment also would have benefited the analysis of why exposure influences contribution
amounts.

7. Conclusion
In this study, I have sought to understand the impact of natural disaster exposure on
prosocial preferences and the provision of public goods. The motivation of this study is to
investigate if social capital and public goods provision are influenced by exogenous shocks in the
environment, and if they are, why this may happen. I find there are no economic or statistically
significant relationships at the 5% and 10% significance levels between natural disaster exposure and
prosocial preferences, except for two indicators with altruism. Robustness checks involving
alternative outcome variables as well as a couple different models yielded similar results. I also find
there is an economically and statistically significant impact of natural disaster exposure on
contribution amounts for four of the disaster indicators at the 5% and 10% significance levels; these
findings are robust to different model specifications.
Prosocial preferences were found to lack significant relationships with the disaster indicators
and do not have a strong correlation with contribution amounts. This contradicts evidence of
natural disaster exposure increasing prosocial preferences from the sociological and behavioral
economics literature. I conclude that natural disaster exposure has a substantive effect on
contribution amounts towards community goods, and therefore, is influencing the dynamics of
public goods provision in the communities. These findings are consistent with the private provision
of public goods literature finding exogenous shocks decrease the rate of cooperation and provision
of public goods. Therefore, from these results I argue that a social capital framework does not
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appropriately explain the contribution results. Instead, I utilize a theoretical model on public goods
provision to explain why exposure to natural disasters decreases public goods donations and
increases the amount of money kept privately. From this model it can be inferred that individuals
contribute less to public goods when exposed to natural disasters because they experience greater
utility when keeping the money due to higher private returns. This is because when exposed to a
natural disaster private losses are incurred that must be recovered from first before contributing to a
public good. Although other mechanisms could be used to explain this relationship, they are outside
the capacity of my research.
These are important findings for designing climate change adaptation policies. In the long
run, if policy makers can increase contributions towards public goods, it may result in stronger
institutions, and in return, they may endure natural disasters more successfully. However, further
research is required to understand how people in the Solomon Islands recover from their losses over
time. These people may be in a fairly regular state of recovery as a result of enduring frequent
natural disasters from year to year. If this is the case, it is not surprising that they are not as willing to
contribute to a public goods project when they need to make private investments in order to recoup
from these disasters.
Additional research should explore how repeated exposure to bad shocks can impact
preference formation and behaviors. Recurrent disasters expose people in geologically unstable areas
to trauma, and identifying culturally specific and culturally invariant symptoms of distress will be key
in assessing the true impact of disasters on preferences and behaviors. Also, it is important to
research how repeated exposure influences perceptions of, and preparedness for, the next disaster
threat. Understanding this will better inform policy makers of the stress after a disaster’s aftermath,
as well as resilience and coping mechanisms. Knowledge of both these topics can be used to explain
prosocial preferences and public goods provision dynamics after disasters. Such information can
also improve disaster preparedness, aid intervention and recovery programs.
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goods provision
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Low contributions to public goods with high
et al. (2000), Gangadharan and Nemes (2009)
environmental uncertainty
Adreoni (1990), (1988)
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Brekke et al. (2003)
Model of Moral Motivation
Frey (1997)
Crowding Theory
Gambetta (1990)
Increased trust leads to better institutions
Geigler et al. (1996),
Ability to adapt relies in networks and social
Adger (2003)
capital of groups
Toya and Skidmore (2012), Cassar, Healy, and Natural disasters influence individual perceptions
von Kessler (2011)
and trust
Solnit (2009)
Disasters increase cooperation
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Table 2: Summary Statistics for Treatment Group
Treatment Group
Overall
No
t-statistic (N
(N, Std.
Exposure
Exposure
for 0,1)
Dev.)
Control Variables
Married
Engaged
Single
Widower
Female
Age
Number of
Children
Wealth
Spouse
Present
during SCA
Participated
in RDP
Meetings
Member of
RDP
Participated
in Building
of RDP
Project
Satisfaction
with Project

0.72
(1600, 0.45)
0.02
(1600, 0.14)
0.17
(1600, 0.37)
0.05
(1600, 0.22)
0.50
(1600, 0.50)
39.70
(1520, 14.13)

0.74
(0.44)
0.02
(0.15)
0.14
(0.35)
0.05
(0.22)
0.50
(0.50)
40.42
(13.48)

0.71
(0.45)
0.03
(0.16)
0.22
(0.41)
0.05
(0.21)
0.50
(0.50)
38.43
(14.18)

0.76
(260, 540)
0.41
(260, 540)
2.60***
(260, 540)
0.35
(260, 540)
0.00
(260, 540)
1.91*
(259, 520)

3.52
(1501, 2.54)
1.13
(1600, 0.86)

3.54
(2.46)
1.16
(0.89)

3.36
(2.78)
1.19
(0.77)

0.90
(257, 508)
0.51
(260, 540)

0.55
(1500, 0.73)

0.46
(0.68)

0.71
(0.80)

4.55***
(259, 508)

0.60
(1480, 0.49)

0.56
(0.50)

0.59
(0.49)

0.99
(258, 506)

0.18
(1175, 0.39)

0.16
(0.36)

0.19
(0.39)

1.04
(167, 429)

0.78
(1457, 0.42)

0.75
(0.44)

0.79
(0.41)

1.27
(250, 500)

0.95
(1506, 0.21)

0.95
(0.21)

0.98
(0.15)

1.68*
(257, 516)

Notes: This table reports the means, standard deviations, and t-tests of difference in
means. The variable used to assess exposure is the "exposed1" variable, which takes
on the value of 1 if a community experienced at least one natural disaster in the past
year. *** indicates difference is statistically significant at the 1% level, ** at 5% level,
and * at 10% level.
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2.38
(1507, 0.74)

2.48
(1508, 0.67)

13.63
(1465, 5.06)
16.66
(1480, 4.02)
12.31
(1458, 3.81)

2.38
(0.75)

2.49
(0.66)

13.44
(4.89)
16.61
(3.84)
12.62
(3.88)

2.38
(0.74)

2.46
(0.69)

13.84
(5.22)
16.71
(4.20)
11.98
(3.71)

0.09
(737, 770)

0.79
(738, 770)

1.49
(714, 751)
0.50
(719, 761)
3.20***
(710, 748)

2.40
(0.72)

2.47
(0.68)

13.5
(4.98)
16.58
(4.05)
12.7
(3.84)

2.34
(0.79)

2.5
(0.67)

13.9
(5.20)
16.82
(3.95)
11.54
(3.63)

1.64
(504, 1003)

0.87
(504, 1004)

1.44
(487, 978)
1.07
(490, 990)
5.51***
(490, 968)

t-statistic
(N for 0,1)

2.42
(0.72)

2.46
(0.67)

13.62
(4.84)
16.78
(3.76)
13.10
(4.09)

2.29
(0.79)

2.56
(0.64)

13.09
(4.98)
16.27
(3.96)
11.68
(3.23)

2.27**
(257, 513)

2.03**
(257, 513)

1.39
(253, 498)
1.73*
(255, 506)
4.82***
(254, 494)

Treatment Group
No
t-statistic
Exposure
Exposure (N for 0,1)
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Notes: This table reports the means, standard deviations, and t-tests of difference in means. The variable used to assess exposure is the "exposed1" variable, which takes on the value of 1
if a community experienced at least one natural disaster in the past year. *** indicates difference is statistically significant at the 1% level, ** at 5% level, and * at 10% level.

Worried Others
Will Cheat

Other Variables
Feels Safe

Altruism

Reciprocity

Prosocial Variables
Trust

Overall
(N, Std. Dev.)

Table 3: Summary Statistics for Prosocial Indicators
All Subjects
Treatment
Control
t-statistic
No
Exposure
Group
Group
(N for 0,1)
Exposure

Table 6: Frequency of Contribution Amounts
Total Population
Contribution
Amount

Freq. Percent

0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50

5
22
49
32
95
222
105
55
66
31
105

0.64
2.8
6.23
4.07
12.07
28.21
13.34
6.99
8.39
3.94
13.34

Total

787

100.00

Cum.
0.64
3.43
9.66
13.72
25.79
54.00
67.34
74.33
82.72
86.66
100.00

Contribution with no
Exposure
Freq. Percent
2
3
7
10
26
62
23
23
26
19
59

0.77
1.15
2.69
3.85
10.00
23.85
8.85
8.85
10.00
7.31
22.69

260

100.00

Cum.
0.77
1.92
4.62
8.46
18.46
42.31
51.15
60.00
70.00
77.31
100.00

Contribution with
Exposure
Freq. Percent Cum.
3
19
42
22
69
160
82
32
40
12
46

0.57
3.61
7.97
4.17
13.09
30.36
15.56
6.07
7.59
2.28
8.73

527

100.00

0.57
4.17
12.14
16.32
29.41
59.77
75.33
81.40
88.99
91.27
100.00

Notes: This table reports the frequency and percentage of contribution amounts from the SCA.
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Table 8: Disaster Indicator Regression Results for Feeling Safe and Worried
Others Will Cheat or Steal
(1)
(2)
Worried Others Will
Feels Safe in Community
Cheat or Steal from You
OLS with # of Obsv.
OLS with # of Obsv.
Controls
R-squared
Controls
R-squared
VARIABLES
Drought
Earthquake
Flood
Landslide
Tsunami
High rains
Exposed to 1
Exposed to 2

-0.03
(0.07)
0.07
(0.07)
0.03
(0.08)
0.05
(0.11)
-0.07
(0.08)
-0.06
(0.05)
-0.07
(0.05)
-0.07
(0.06)

1,433
0.01
1,433
0.01
1,433
0.01
1,433
0.01
1,433
0.01
1,402
0.01
1,450
0.01
1,450
0.01

0.07
(0.10)
-0.12
(0.08)
0.03
(0.12)
0.23
(0.08)
0.03
(0.09)
0.10
(0.08)
0.08
(0.06)
0.04
(0.08)

1,431
0.04
1,431
0.04
1,431
0.04
1,431
0.05
1,431
0.04
1,402
0.05
1,448
0.04
1,448
0.04

Note: Each of these indicators were run separately in a regression with
feeling safe and worried others will cheat or steal as the outcome. Individual
controls are not included in this table. These controls are: Marital Status
dummies, Female dummy, Age, Number of Children, and Wealth. Number of
children and female show significance in the worried others will cheat
regressions. Fixed effects at the province level and clustered standard errors
at the village level are used in all regressions. Standard errors are in
parentheses. *** indicates statistical significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level,
and * at 10% level.
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Table 10: Ordered Logit Disaster
Indicator Regression Results for
Contribution Amount Outcome Variable
OLS with
Controls

VARIABLES
Drought

-1.29*
(0.55)
-0.30
(0.48)
-1.47
(0.95)
-1.85**
(0.28)
-0.81
(0.53)
-0.84
(0.54)

Earthquake
Flood
Landslide
Tsunami
High rains
Exposed to 1

-1.19*
(0.52)

Exposed to 2

-1.25*
(0.51)

Observations

535.00

Note: Each of these indicators were run
separately in a regression with
Contribution Amount as the outcome.
Individual controls are not included in
this table. These controls are: Marital
Status dummies, Female dummy, Age,
Number of Children, Wealth,
Satisfaction with SCA project, Spouse
Present during SCA, Member of RDP,
Participated in RDP meetings and
Participated in RDP building process.
None of these controls show significance
in any of the regressions. Fixed effects
are used in all regressions along with
clustered standard errors at the village
level. Standard errors are in parentheses.
*** indicates statistical significance at 1%
level, ** at 5% level, and * at 10% level
and are adjusted using the HolmBonferroni correction.
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Table 11: Ordered Logit Disaster Indicator Regression Results for Prosocial Preference Outcome Variables
Trust
Reciprocity
Altruism
(1)
(2)
(3)
OLS with
# of
OLS with
# of
OLS with
# of
Controls
Observ.
Controls
Observ.
Controls
Observ.
VARIABLES
Drought
Earthquake
Flood
Landslide
Tsunami
High rains
Exposed to 1
Exposed to 2

0.01
(0.24)
-0.11
(0.25)
-0.22
(0.29)
0.13
(0.18)
0.01
(0.25)
-0.01
(0.23)
-0.07
(0.18)
0.09
(0.19)

1390
1390
1390
1390
1390
1363
1406
1406

-0.33
(0.30)
-0.29
(0.25)
-0.17
(0.20)
0.15
(0.30)
-0.39
(0.12)
0.05
(0.21)
-0.08
(0.17)
-0.17
(0.20)

1407
1407
1407
1407
1407
1379
1423
1423

-0.04
(0.23)
0.37
(0.21)
0.15
(0.21)
-0.10
(0.24)
0.23
(0.18)
0.47**
(0.14)
0.32
(0.16)
0.23
(0.20)

1388
1388
1388
1388
1388
1359
1404
1404

Note: Each of these indicators were run separately in a regression with the prosocial preferences as the
outcome. Individual controls are not included in this table. These controls are: Marital Status dummies,
Female dummy, Age, Number of Children, and Wealth. Age shows significance in all of the regressions
listed in column 1. Number of children shows significance in all of the regressions in column 2. None of
the control variables show significance in any of the regressions in column 3. Fixed effects are used in all
regressions along with clustered standard errors at the village level. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***
indicates statistical significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level, and * at 10% level and are adjusted with the HolmBonferroni correction.
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Table 12: Tobit Disaster Indicator Regression Results for Prosocial Preference Outcome Variables
Trust
Reciprocity
Altruism
(1)
(2)
(3)
OLS with
# of
OLS with
# of
OLS with
# of
Controls
Observ.
Controls
Observ.
Controls
Observ.
VARIABLES
Drought
Earthquake
Flood
Landslide
Tsunami
High rains
Exposed to 1
Exposed to 2

-0.11
(0.81)
-0.30
(0.79)
-0.59
(0.85)
0.68
(0.63)
-0.09
(0.82)
0.17
(0.73)
-0.22
(0.60)
0.47
(0.59)

1390
1390
1390
1390
1390
1363
1406
1406

-1.25
(1.07)
-1.15
(0.95)
-0.76
(0.71)
0.56
(1.07)
-1.38**
(0.43)
0.10
(0.75)
-0.39
(0.58)
-0.63
(0.74)

1407
1407
1407
1407
1407
1379
1423
1423

0.15
(0.52)
0.72
(0.48)
0.40
(0.42)
-0.05
(0.42)
0.36
(0.36)
1.14***
(0.32)
0.82*
(0.34)
0.49
(0.43)

1388
1388
1388
1388
1388
1359
1404
1404

Note: Each of these indicators were run separately in a regression with the prosocial preferences as the
outcome. Individual controls are not included in this table. These controls are: Marital Status dummies,
Female dummy, Age, Number of Children, and Wealth. Age shows significance in all of the regressions listed
in column 1. Number of children shows significance in all of the regressions in column 2. None of the
control variables show significance in any of the regressions in column 3. Fixed effects are used in all
regressions along with clustered standard errors at the village level. All are censored at the right by 20.
Standard errors are in parentheses. *** indicates statistical significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level, and * at
10% level and are adjusted using the Holm-Bonferroni correction.
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Appendix C: Case Study
Case Study: Agricultural Extension Efficiency and Risk in Infrastructure Building in
the Context of Climate Change
What Changes Have People Noticed in Their Environment?

The people of Choiseul have been noticing changes in their environment over the
past few decades, especially within the last 10 years. Most of them have noticed that these
changes are occurring at a more frequent rate over the last few years. The causes of such
changes are not well understood. In particular, many of those in areas where the tsunami hit
in 2007, for example the village of Voza, attribute the changes they are noticing in the
environment to the tsunami. Nevertheless, regardless of when they started to notice the
changes, nearly every community has been affected in some way by climate change.
The most frequently reported change consists of a shift in the pattern of seasons. In
each of the 14 Choiseul villages examined as part of this case study, members reported that
there used to be seasons and now there are not. In particular, the rain has increased in the
dry seasons and there have been fewer and/or shorter breaks without relatively heavy rains.
This is a major problem because this increased rain is causing soil erosion, crop failure and
rot, reducing yields, and is making it generally harder for the communities to grow certain
crops, mainly root crops and others, such as taro, sweet potatoes, cassava, cabbage, fruits,
etc. Soil erosion is aggravated in many areas by logging.
The increased rain and higher winds during the dry season also makes it difficult for
the people to fish and travel. The weather has become unpredictable, which makes fishing
trips more difficult to plan and riskier. Many communities, such as Ngarione, Pangoe, and
Kukutin report that because of the changing climate and unpredictability, they sometimes
lose out on income because they cannot go out to sea or get stuck somewhere else for days,
spoiling their products. They also can no longer plan on when they can work, so events,
jobs, and community tasks get interrupted, as they must go out to sea whenever it is calm in
case a storm rolls in again.
Another change that people have noticed is a decreasing fish population. In Moli,
Voza, Ngarione, Voru Voru, Susuka, Patubelo, Vure, Kukutin, and Taro, the people have to
go much farther out to sea to find fish than in previous years, and have to venture to
different parts of the island as well. In Moli, residents reported having to conserve part of
their oceans so that the corals will grow back. In Voza, they have conserved their islands as
well to regrow the fish that they have lost in those waters.
Lastly, a number of the communities noted an increase in sea levels. This is
particularly problematic for these coastal communities that have to relocate as a consequence
of rising sea levels. For example, Patubelo moved their community up into the hills in the
1980’s because the sea level was rising so rapidly. In an even more drastic example, the
Micronesian community of Kukutin was displaced to the island of Wagina as a result of sea
levels rising about thirty years ago. They have noticed it happening on their current island
since they were moved and say that they are planning to buy land elsewhere to evacuate
people as the sea level continues to rise.
What Does the Rainfall Data Say?
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Rainfall data from The Ministry of Meteorology from 2000 to 2012 in Choiseul
reveals that although the total rainfall each year has not changed overall and has consistently
been around 3200mm a year over the period, rainfall seems indeed to be increasing in the
dry season and decreasing in the wet season. This confirms the perceptions of shifting
seasons by the communities across the island. In months such as August and September, the
increase in the amount of rain is quite drastic.
Helping Villages Deal with Environmental Change: Information Dissemination and
Village Dynamics

Government, as well as independent effort by conservationist groups and aid
organizations, aim to help communities deal with the challenges of climate change. In
particular, as part of RDP component 2, the Government of the Solomon Islands’ Ministry
of Development and Planning and Aid Coordination (MDPAC) has sponsored agricultural
extension services. RDP component 1, devoted to local infrastructure and services also
represents an opportunity for communities to build local infrastructure that can mitigate
some of the risk of climate change, namely for water resource management. The question
investigated here is whether these resources are used to mitigate the risk of climate change
and whether they are used in an efficient way; and if not, what are some of the obstacles that
explain this failure.
Many of the communities have been visited by agricultural extension services from
the MDPAC as well as other conservationist groups, in order to assess the changes that the
communities went through, spread awareness of the challenges at stake and discuss
adaptation strategies. Staff from these agencies have discussed techniques such as planting
mangroves to prevent erosion, and using organic matter when planting, which can
substantially raise yields. Marine conservation groups are also going to some of the
communities to teach them the importance of conserving their reefs and oceans to regrow
the marine life.
Despite such efforts, however, very few in the community know about climate
change or are aware of possible adaptation techniques. Throughout my investigation, I
identified two major problems: (i) how the groups deliver their messages, and (ii) dynamics
in the villages’ responses. From my discussions with the community members in the villages,
it seems that many of the groups that come into the villages are doing assessments. They do
not take the time to fully explain why they are there and tend to use jargon that community
members do not necessarily understand. In particular, they use the term “climate change,”
which is why some of them have heard of that term before and know it has to do with the
environment but do not have a good grasp on the concept. The groups that come in to teach
them adaptation techniques also focus more on the adaptation aspect and less on trying to
get them to understand the full picture. The groups do not ask the people for their opinions
or what they think climate change is and talk in a way that is hard for them to understand.
When these groups explain it they use terminology that is confusing for the people, do not
take into account their traditional knowledge, and do not realize that there is a division of
labor between males and females in the village regarding agriculture and fishing. Lastly, the
community members told me that when the groups come in they also do not always give
adequate warning to the village about their arrival, so not everyone that should or would like
to come shows up to the meetings.
The meetings are generally not inclusive enough, on the two dimensions of: i) social
and political hierarchy, and ii) gender. For example, the schoolteacher in Kukutin explained
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to me that when groups come in to speak with them, regardless if there is warning or not,
only the village leaders attend. If the village leaders think that the message is important for
the community, then they will either invite the rest of the community to join or will relay the
message themselves. Obviously, this means that a lot of messages will be lost and might be
distorted. In Patubelo (a relatively small community), the pastor’s wife told me that since it is
such a small community when outsiders come everyone is openly invited, not only because it
is easier to do so but also because you can’t hide the visitors from the rest of the community.
In most of the villages, it is the case that the leaders met with outsiders first and then opened
it up to the rest of the community. Clearly, if not everyone can attend this would impede the
message from spreading. However, if the villagers really want to attend something that they
catch wind of, in most villages, they will at least try to attend and gather around.
Gender differences are another reason as to why not everyone in the communities
may have knowledge about climate change. Women in general, despite being at the forefront
of the battle against the negative effects of environmental change, are kept out of
community meetings as they are attending to the children and it is culturally viewed that they
do not need to be a part of the process like the men do. Typically, women are the ones that
collect shells and crabs, while men go out further in the sea and fish. Women also are the
ones that generally plant the seeds, maintain the plants, and keep an eye out for when they
must be harvested, and men are the ones that do the heavier labor. However, depending on
the task and type of plant, duties may change or overlap. For example, many of the
agricultural groups that come teach them to plant mangroves to reduce erosion and to use
alternative species of crops to increase yields. In some communities those are the women’s
duties, so it would impede the delivery of the message if women were not invited to the
meetings. The men may only relay to the community the techniques that impact their duties,
thereby directly hindering the effectiveness of government and independent effort.
Using Climate Change Knowledge in Decision-Making and Infrastructure Building

In the communities that had visits by organizations regarding climate change related
issues, only few are implementing some of the adaptation techniques that they learned. Out
of the 14 communities, 8 had groups come to visit them. Out of those 8, only Moli, Voza,
Voru Voru and Susuka told me they have incorporated some of what they were taught into
the management of their ocean or agriculture. The reason why some villages began adapting
these techniques and others did not is hard to say. However, in the communities that told
me that they were using these techniques also said that the whole community attended the
meetings held by the organizations. Participation in meetings means that there is more
awareness happening, which would influence the community’s choice to incorporate what
they were taught into their daily lives.
Another relevant question for the assessment of RDP-1 is whether the people of
Choiseul used their knowledge or perceptions about climate change when they made
decisions regarding infrastructure choice and infrastructure building. Even though many
people are aware of changes in the environment and the climate, they do not use that
information when they are deciding on projects in their community. I asked every village this
and no one in any of the communities said that their knowledge of climate change
influenced their decision making in any way. Many communities are still building close to the
water or on hills that are endangered by mudslides due to logging and heavy rains.
For the few that understand about climate change and are involved in the
community, it is very frustrating to them that this has not yet been a factor in their decisions.
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A teacher in Kukutin has blamed the inability of communities to incorporate environmental
change in their decision-making not only on their lack of awareness but also on the lack of
support from the agencies that come in to help them build infrastructure.
From my discussions with the community members in the villages it seems as though
they already feel very wary of environmental change, but have little understanding of it and
often feel helpless. Many community members are concerned about the decisions made by
the community. They have become wary of investment, in particular RDP funded
infrastructure projects, because of the risk that it will be destroyed by a climate related event.
Yet, they feel as though they do not have the right tools to make the least risky decisions.
Going forward, it is extremely important that the messages regarding climate change and
adaptation are delivered to everyone and in a way that they will understand. This will
hopefully allow the community to come together and support decisions on infrastructure
that will be long lasting.
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